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THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF
SHAREHOLDER GOVERNANCE
R.C. NOLAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE law which governs decision-making by the shareholders (or,
strictly speaking, members) of a company is an area in which there
is a great emphasis on regulation. This emphasis has tended to
obscure the basic principles of law around which that regulation
has developed. It has also distracted attention away from an
appreciation of how those principles are applied and developed in
practice.1
For many years, this did not seem to matter very much.
Understanding the mechanisms by which shareholders made
decisions was largely unnecessary when running any ‘‘standard’’
general meeting of a company. Common practice for such meetings
was so well established that there seemed to be little need to do
anything other than ensure compliance with current regulation. A
small number of highly knowledgeable specialist practitioners could
deal with anything marginal, or unusual, or contestable connected
with a purported meeting of shareholders. So legal writing about
decision-making by shareholders was largely limited to practitioner
works.2 What, then, if anything, has changed, so as to warrant any
* Fellow of St John’s College, Cambridge and Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of
Cambridge; Door Tenant, Erskine Chambers, Lincoln’s Inn. The author is grateful to Mr.
John Armour, Professor Elizabeth Boros, Professor Brian Cheﬃns, Adam Cloherty, John
Cone, Professor Eilı´s Ferran, Professor Adrian Walters and Professor Peter Watts for their
comments on earlier drafts of this article, as well as to the Law Faculties of the University of
Sydney and Monash University for their great hospitality to the author while researching and
writing this article. The usual disclaimers apply.
1 The Company Law Review produced a useful set of documents about the law regulating
corporate decision-making, but it did not examine the principles onto which such regulation is
grafted, nor the practice built on them. The Review only obliquely acknowledged the principles
in Developing the Framework (London 2000), at x4.19. The Government’s approach followed
the Review’s: Modernising Company Law (Cm. 5553 (2002)), at x2.8.
2 See D. Impey et al., The Modern Law of Meetings (Bristol 2005); I. Shearman, Shackleton on
the Law and Practice of Meetings (London 2006); A. Hamer and A. Robertson, Running
Company Meetings (Hemel Hempstead 1997). Academic articles published in the UK have
tended to examine aspects of positive law concerned with decision-making by shareholders,
rather than consensual corporate structures: see, e.g., R. Grantham, ‘‘The Unanimous Consent
Rule in Company Law’’ [1993] C.L.J. 245, and, most recently, Watts, ‘‘Informal Unanimous
Assent of Beneﬁcial Shareholders’’ (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 15.
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wider interest in this area of law?3 Three developments of recent
times stand out in particular.
The ﬁrst is the impact of new communication technologies.
There are now more and faster ways for groups to communicate
and to take collective decisions.4 Until recently, groups could meet
physically in order to debate and decide an issue; they could decide
(but could rarely easily debate) an issue by post, telegram or fax;
and, if they were small enough in number for the technology to
cope, they could debate and decide an issue by telephone. Now,
there are all the possibilities of videoconferencing, e-mail and the
web for debate and decision. The recent past also strongly suggests
there will be many more new developments before long. Companies
may well want to press these all these new—and future—
technologies into service.
The second development is the current emphasis on so-called
‘‘shareholder activism’’. Policy-makers increasingly regard it as
important that shareholders, particularly the ﬁnancial institutions
who hold large portfolios of shares, should participate in corporate
governance.5 If such participation is important, it follows that the
means of participation are also important, and deserve attention.6
There are now various proposals for reform of the law relating to
shareholder rights and, more generally, the participation of
investors in companies.7 All of these proposals merit careful
scrutiny in due course; but any reasoned assessment of the
proposals ﬁrst requires an understanding of the legal and
commercial context in which they will operate.
A third trend is the concern to make it easier for investors in a
company to engage in the governance of that company even where
3 As regards practitioner interest, see Company Law Review, Company General Meetings and
Shareholder Communication (London 1999), x14. As regards academic interest, mostly abroad,
see, e.g., S. Bottomley, ‘‘From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for
Corporate Governance’’’ (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 277 and The Role of Shareholders’
Meetings in Improving Corporate Governance (Canberra 2003); R. Simmonds, ‘‘Why Must we
Meet? Thinking about why Shareholders’ Meetings are Required’’ (2001) 19 Company and
Securities Law Journal 506; F. Bonollo, ‘‘Electronic Meetings’’ (2002) 14 Australian Journal of
Corporate Law 95; E. Boros, ‘‘Corporate Governance in Cyberspace: Who Stands to Gain
What From the Virtual Meeting?’’ [2003] Journal of Corporate Law Studies 149 and ‘‘Virtual
Shareholder Meetings: Who Decides How Companies Make Decisions?’’ (2004) 28 Melbourne
University Law Review 265.
4 See in particular The Strategic Framework (London 1999), x5.7.18 and Company General
Meetings and Shareholder Communication (note 3 above), x14.
5 Company Law Review, Final Report (London 2001), xx1.52 and 1.56–1.57, chapters 3 and 7;
P. Myners, Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review (London 2001); Combined Code on
Corporate Governance (London 2003), Principle E3.
6 See P. Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares: Report by Paul Myners to the
Shareholder Voting Working Group (London 2004), particularly at x1.2.
7 See Company Law Reform (Cm. 6456 (2005)), xx3, 3.1, 3.2 and the Company Law Reform Bill
clauses 136–137, 258–334. Note also the developments at European Union level: see hhttp://
europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/shareholders/index_en.htmi.
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they hold their shares through one or more nominees. For a variety
of reasons, large numbers of shares are held in the names of
nominees or other ﬁnancial intermediaries, and such widespread use
of intermediaries makes it more diﬃcult to achieve the objective of
responsible shareholder activism.8 This is because the power to act
as a responsible shareholder and the economic incentive to act as
such are divided when shares are vested in an intermediary. The
registered, non-beneﬁcial, owner of shares (the intermediary) has all
the powers and privileges attaching to those shares as against the
company which issued them: the registered owner is entitled to
those powers and privileges simply by being a member of the
company,9 and, as against the company, any trust aﬀecting the
shares does not alter that fact.10 Yet an intermediary has little
economic incentive to use those powers and privileges, and to
engage in the governance of the company, because any advantage
from doing so will accrue to the investor who is the ultimate
beneﬁciary of the shares. Consequently, there is currently great
interest in mechanisms that might make it easier for the investor to
engage in the governance of the company.11
The response to these developments depends, however, on the
goals to be achieved. The arguments presented here rest on the
basic premise that British company law manifests deliberate policy
choices in favor of allowing shareholders to exercise residual and
ultimate control in companies,12 and that these choices have been
8 See, generally, R.C. Nolan, ‘‘Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in the Company?’’ [2003]
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 73; G.P. Stapledon and J.J. Bates, ‘‘Reducing the Costs of
Proxy Voting’’, chapter 24 in J. McCahery et al., Corporate Governance Regimes (Oxford
2002) and P. Myners, ‘‘Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares’’ (note 6 above).
9 Companies Act 1985, sections 14 and 22, read together with the company’s memorandum and
articles of association.
10 Companies Act 1985, s. 360, as supplemented by the company’s articles of association, for
example reg. 5 of Table A (‘‘Table A (1985)’’) in the Companies (Tables A–F) Regulations
1985 (S.I. 1985/805).
11 The DTI has now brought forward proposals in this regard: see Company Law Reform (note 7
above), x3.2 and the Company Law Reform Bill clauses 136–137. The EU is currently looking
at the issues in the context of cross-border voting as part of its review of shareholder rights:
see note 7 above.
12 There is a vast and ever-growing body of literature which seeks to establish the most
appropriate basis on which companies should be organised: the so-called ‘‘stake-holder
debate’’. In July 1999, Cook and Deakin prepared a very comprehensive review of the
literature for the Company Law Review Steering Group, available at hhttp://www.dti.gov.uk/
cld/esrc1.pdfi. See also E. Ferran’s critical summary of the debate about stakeholders in
companies: Company Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford 1999), chapter 4. Other recent
contributions to the debate include R. Grantham, ‘‘The Doctrinal Basis of the Right of
Company Shareholders’’ [1998] C.L.J. 554; P. Ireland, ‘‘Company Law and the Myth of
Shareholder Ownership’’ (1999) 62 M.L.R. 32; J. Parkinson et al., The Political Economy of
the Company (Oxford 2001), chapter 6; A. Gamble and G. Kelly, ‘‘Shareholder Value and the
Stakeholder Debate in the UK’’ (2001) 9 Corporate Governance International Review 110; S.
Worthington, ‘‘Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement’’ (2001) 22
Company Lawyer 258 and 307; Wedderburn, ‘‘Employees, Partnership and Company Law’’
(2002) 31 Industrial Law Journal 99, and Lynch Fannon, Working Within Two Kinds of
Capitalism (Oxford 2003). Professor Farrar has also published a useful work for comparative
purposes, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford 2001).
94 The Cambridge Law Journal [2006]
conﬁrmed for the foreseeable future at least.13 The doctrinal rights
of shareholders—the positive law manifested in the companies
legislation—follow deductively from that political choice.
(Shareholders’ rights are not primarily the inductive inference from
judicial decisions: cases about shareholders’ rights have only an
interstitial function, clarifying and ﬂeshing out the relevant
legislation and corporate documentation.) Any discussion of
shareholders’ rights should be clear about this, in order to avoid
confusion.14
From this premise of political and economic policy, the article
turns to address positive law. It ﬁrst seeks to show that English
company law has at its core a simple—but very ﬂexible—
empowering, facultative principle, through which shareholders can
establish in a company’s articles of association (or sometimes in its
memorandum of association) how they will interact with each
other, and with other participants in the company.15 This principle
is presently embodied in section 14 of the Companies Act 1985,
which gives eﬀect to the consensual arrangements established
between shareholders and embodied in a company’s articles. Section
14 is the subject of much unsatisfactory glossing and interpretation,
and it has a rather poor reputation amongst lawyers as a result.16
However, its basic principle—giving enduring legal eﬀect to
shareholders’ bargains as to how their company is to be run—is
vital, ﬂexible and powerful.
Those involved in a company, and, crucially, their legal advisers,
are consequently at the very center of developments in how
13 The question of altering the model of the company was squarely posed for the Company Law
Review: Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy (London 1998), x 3.7. The Review
gave an equally clear answer to the question in favor of retaining the present, shareholder-
focussed model: see The Strategic Framework (note 4 above), chapter 5.1; Developing the
Framework (note 1 above), chapter 3; Completing the Structure (London 2000), chapter 3.5.
The UK Government adopted the conclusions of the Reviews: Modernising Company Law
(note 1 above), x3.3. None of this means that any other model of associative enterprise must
necessarily be rejected: it simply means that the Companies Acts embody one model and will
continue to do so. Other models, such as friendly societies and community interest companies,
are provided by other statutes for use in other, appropriate, contexts.
14 The impact on meetings, and other collective action by shareholders, of the general policy
debates about the role of shareholders in a company are well considered by Justice
Simmonds: see ‘‘Why Must we Meet?’’ (note 3 above), pp. 508–514.
15 The rest of this article will refer only to articles of association, because the overwhelmingly
standard practice is to establish shareholders’ governance arrangements in a company’s
articles rather than its memorandum. For the purposes of this article, the author surveyed the
memoranda and articles as at 16th January 2004 of all the companies comprised in the FTSE
100 Index at that date. That survey showed all such arrangements to be in the respective
companies’ articles.
16 There is a very great deal of detailed learning on—and glossing of—section 14 and its various
predecessor provisions. See generally Buckley on the Companies Acts (15th ed. by Dame Mary
Arden et al., London 2000), at [14.5]–[14.10], and P.L. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of
Modern Company Law (London 2003), pp. 58–65. None of that unsatisfactory detail, or
glossing, is relevant for present purposes. What is relevant is the basic principle of statute
giving legal eﬀect to consensual arrangements.
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shareholders interact with each other and with the oﬃcers of the
company. These internal participants in companies, and their
respective advisers, design the corporate structures through which
shareholders’ rights are expressed, and they drive the innovative
development of such structures. These facts are often overlooked.
This article seeks to remedy such neglect. It draws heavily on
evidence of legal practice in order to demonstrate the central
importance of legal practice to the evolution of English company
law.
Equally, the article shows how a very large raft of regulation
came to overlie, and to an extent obscure, the fundamental
principles of law which underpin shareholders’ governance of
companies. This regulation limited the shareholders’ freedom to
organise their aﬀairs because they could use that freedom to the
detriment of others: a company’s articles can be amended by a
weighted majority of votes cast by its members, acting in good
faith,17 contrary to the wishes and interests of the minority.
Furthermore, lawyers instructed by a company’s directors usually
draft its articles (and subsequent amendments to, or replacements
of, them) in terms which reﬂect what the directors want, tempered
by the directors’ good faith to shareholders and, in some cases, by
their appreciation of what the shareholders will accept.
Notwithstanding such good reasons for limiting the
shareholders’ freedom to establish a company’s articles, the relevant
regulatory rules are premised on assumptions that have become
outmoded and inaccurate, as will be made clear. Consequently, they
now form a barrier to entirely unobjectionable developments in
corporate governance. Nevertheless, legal practitioners have used,
and can still use, these basic principles to adapt corporate
communication and decision-making to new circumstances and the
challenges of change. A survey of the techniques currently used by
listed companies for such purposes will make that quite plain.18
All this, in turn, has signiﬁcant normative implications for the
future development of the law within its current, basic policy
framework. This article seeks to establish those implications as a
matter of general policy. Its conclusions can then form the
necessary foundations of further work to examine and assess both
17 Companies Act 1985, s. 9. A special resolution, required by section 9, is now deﬁned in
section 378 of the Act as carried by at least 75% of the votes cast. As to the requirement of
good faith, see Allen v. Gold Reef of West Africa [1900] 1 Ch. 656 and, generally, Buckley on
the Companies Acts (op. cit. note 16), at [9.24]–[9.32].
18 For the purposes of this article, as indicated at note 15 above, the author surveyed the articles
as at 16th January 2004 of all the companies comprised in the FTSE 100 Index at that date.
References to the articles of a particular FTSE 100 company are therefore references to its
most recent articles available at Companies House on that date.
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current practice and proposals for reform of the law. These
conclusions are, essentially, as follows.
First, and most importantly, there are good reasons for a
continued adherence to the law’s present, basic facultative structure
so far as the ‘‘internal participants’’ of a company—its members—
are concerned. English company law is a system in which
innovation largely was, and still is, driven by participants in
companies and their advisers, who make full use of its basic,
facultative rules. This has generally been beneﬁcial and eﬃcient.
Consequently, the law should continue to prefer a system which
accommodates such innovation: in other words, changes to
corporate decision-making processes both can and should, to a
great extent, be accommodated within the existing facultative
structure.19 This does not, however, mean that there is no role for
the state in regulating corporate governance structures. What it
does mean is that the various techniques of regulation require
careful thought and justiﬁcation.
This is, then, the second implication for the future development
of the law. If regulation is to set boundaries to a regime that is
essentially facultative, open and innovative, operating in a fast
changing world, then policy-makers should establish in the light of
experience what goals they wish to achieve, and then seek to
regulate by reference to those goals, not the means used at any one
time to achieve them. Only if there is one particular means to
secure the desired end should regulation be directed towards the
use of such means. Even here, caution is in order, as new, hitherto
unimagined, ways of achieving a goal may quickly upset the
assumption that some particular means are necessary to achieve a
particular result.
The reasons why policy-makers should adopt such an approach
are relatively easy to discern. The basic goals of corporate
activity—to raise capital, to deploy it in running a business, to
make proﬁts and ultimately to distribute them—have changed
relatively little over the last 150 years.20 In such broad, goal-
oriented outline, most of modern business would be very easily
recognisable to, and comprehensible by, our Victorian forebears
who ﬁrst created modern company law. However, the methods used
to achieve those goals have changed radically over the same period.
19 Modiﬁcations to the structure (but only modiﬁcations) are needed if anyone currently outside
it (such as indirect investors) is to be brought directly within it. These matters are addressed
at length in Nolan, ‘‘Indirect Investors’’ (note 8 above). They are consequently not addressed
further in this article. See now clauses 136–137 of the Company Law Reform Bill.
20 This is certainly not to say that these goals have remained unchallenged over that time: see
note 12 above. Nevertheless, in the United Kingdom at least, they continue to command the
support of policy-makers: see note 13 above.
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Companies raise capital and run businesses in a social and
regulatory environment that is utterly unlike the high Victorian era
of full-blooded laissez faire.21 Crucially, and as noted earlier, the
technology available to companies nowadays is totally diﬀerent
from the technology of earlier days. In short, the goals of business
have remained much more stable than the means used to achieve
those goals. Consequently, it makes sense to regulate goals rather
than means, as regulation of means is very much more likely to
become swiftly out-dated, and even counter-productive, than
regulation of goals. Unfortunately, as will be seen, that is not the
path regulation has taken so far.
In order to reach these conclusions, it is useful ﬁrst to turn to
history. Many things then become much clearer.
II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SHAREHOLDER GOVERNANCE
A. Basic Principles: 1862–1900
The ﬁrst modern companies legislation in the United Kingdom, the
Companies Act 1862, said nothing about the rights of control
shareholders were to have in a company. Indeed, the 1862 Act
contained just ﬁve sections which speciﬁcally concerned how
shareholders were generally to run their aﬀairs within a company.
Section 49 of the 1862 Act, the opening section in a division
headed ‘‘Provisions for Protection of Members’’, required that a
company was to have a general meeting each year.22 Section 52 laid
down four default rules to regulate the calling and conduct of
general meetings, though these rules only applied so far as a
company’s articles of association made no other relevant
provision.23 Sections 53–54 required the registration and publication
of ‘‘special resolutions’’,24 as deﬁned in section 51.25 Finally, section
67 required minutes of any meetings to be kept; provided for such
minutes to be admissible as evidence in legal proceedings, and
raised a presumption that the meeting and its proceedings were
21 As regards ﬁnancial regulation, see The Report of the Committee to Review the Functioning of
Financial Institutions (Cmnd. 7937 (1980)); Rider, Abrams and Ashe, Guide to Financial
Services Regulation (Bicester 1997) chapter 1; Ferran, (note 12 above), chapter 17. As regards
the regulation of business activity generally, its current extent and ubiquity are immediately
apparent from the Department of Trade and Industry’s website at hhttp://www.dti.gov.uk/
regulatory_guidance.htmli. Its continued growth is reported by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales, ‘‘Red tape costing UK business an extra £1 billion a
year’’, available at hhttp://www.icaew.co.uki.
22 Section 49 followed Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s. 32. The more familiar term ‘‘annual
general meeting’’ made its ﬁrst statutory appearance in Companies Act 1947, s. 1, shortly
afterwards consolidated as Companies Act 1948, s. 131.
23 Section 52 had no precursor in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856.
24 Elements of these sections drew on Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, ss. 35–36.
25 This section followed Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s. 34.
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regular.26 That was it. All the rest of the rules about what rights of
governance shareholders were to have, and how they were to
exercise them, were to be found in the company’s articles of
association. So, for example, regulations 29–51 of the standard,
default form of articles (contained in the First Schedule to the 1862
Act)27 provided for the calling of general meetings, the form of
their proceedings, the votes of members and the methods of
voting.28
In terms of principle, this necessarily meant that, subject to any
statutory regulation, governance rights in a company were allocated
by its articles of association, which themselves were given eﬀect by
section 16 of the Companies Act 1862.29 (Section 16 of the 1862
Act, after much re-enactment, now forms section 14 of the
Companies Act 1985.) Most fundamentally, therefore, and subject
only to very limited intervention by the 1862 Act, those who
formed a company were given freedom by statute to order its
governance as they saw ﬁt. As Bowen L.J. put it, in Harben v.
Phillips,
[W]hen persons agree to act together in the conduct of a
business, the way in which that business is to be carried on
must depend in each case on the contract, express or implied,
which exists between them as to the way of carrying it on. . . .
When you come to statutory corporations you must look at
the statute itself, and the rules which are created under it . . .30
A registered company limited by shares is indeed the creature of
statute;31 but statute itself grants shareholders in the company a
general freedom to organise their aﬀairs as they see ﬁt, subject to
any applicable regulation. That regulation may be (and
predominantly is) statutory, but it might also arise under listing
rules applicable to companies whose shares are traded on public
markets.
The case of Harben v. Phillips itself provides a good example of
this freedom and its use—the early law relating to proxy voting.
The case shows that there is no right to appoint a proxy at
common law, nor was there any such right in the Companies Act
1862. Rights to appoint a proxy to attend, vote (and possibly
26 This section followed Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s. 40.
27 Hereafter, ‘‘Table A (1862)’’.
28 These regulations drew largely on regs. 22–43 of Table B in the Schedule to the Joint Stock
Companies Act 1856. They broadly presage what are now regs. 36–63 of Table A (1985),
though they are neither so full nor so sophisticated as the modern form of articles.
29 Section 16 drew largely on Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s. 10.
30 (1882) 23 Ch.D. 14, 35–36.
31 See, recently, Halifax plc v. Halifax Repossessions Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 331, [2004] 2
B.C.L.C. 455, at [13], per Arden L.J., and also Welton v. Saﬀery [1897] A.C. 299, 305, per
Lord Halsbury L.C..
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speak) at a meeting of a company’s members originally existed only
by virtue of an express provision in the company’s articles of
association, given eﬀect by what was then section 16 of the 1862
Act and is now section 14 of the Companies Act 1985.32
Correspondingly, a proxy could be appointed in any manner
permitted by the company’s articles of association.33 There were
initially no general legal requirements as to the means for
appointing a proxy though a company’s articles could impose such
requirements. So, while it is not necessary to validate a proxy as a
matter of positive law,34 the articles of association of a particular
company may (and very commonly do) impose such a
requirement.35
Nowadays, by contrast, the right of a member to appoint a
proxy to attend and vote at a general meeting on his behalf is
perceived as a statutory right, set out in section 372 of the
Companies Act 1985. This, however, obscures the origins of the
right to appoint a proxy and, more generally, the legal means of
organising governance in a company, namely the arrangements
adopted by its shareholders as given eﬀect by statute. Granted,
mandatory statute law has taken some of the space formerly
occupied by that bargain, embodied in a company’s articles, but
two points must be made. First, section 372 does not apply to
companies limited by guarantee.36 The basic principles of Harben v.
Phillips still govern whether and how a member can participate by
proxy in the aﬀairs of a company limited by guarantee. Second,
and more importantly, the manner of appointing a proxy, and some
of the proxy’s rights, remain a matter of the particular company’s
articles, though regulated to an extent by section 372.37 As is
32 For examples of the right to appoint proxies conferred by articles of association, see regs. 48–
51 in Table A (1862), and now regs. 59–63 in Table A (1985).
33 Harben v. Phillips (1882) 23 Ch.D. 14, 32, per Cotton L.J., and 35–36, per Bowen L.J.. In so
far as Re English, Scottish & Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch. 385, 395, per Vaughan-
Williams J., suggests otherwise, it must be wrong. Vaughan-Williams J. was dealing with votes
cast under a scheme of arrangement: he was not discussing proxies granted under the terms of
a company’s articles. To the extent that the judge’s words appear wider, they are both obiter
and contrary to Court of Appeal authority in Harben v. Phillips. On the unsuccessful appeal
from the decision of Vaughan-Williams J., the Court of Appeal expressed no opinion about
the form of a proxy.
34 Re English, Scottish & Australian Bank [1893] 3 Ch. 385.
35 See, e.g., Table A (1985), reg. 62.
36 Companies Act 1985, s. 372(2)(a).
37 Companies Act 1985, s. 372(1) (the rights of a proxy for a member in a private, but not a
public, company include the right to speak at the meeting); s. 372(2)(b) (the statutory right is
to appoint one proxy only); s. 372(2)(c) (the statutory right of a proxy to vote exists only on
a poll, not a show of hands); s. 372(3) (the notice of a company general meeting must state
the right to appoint a proxy or (where allowed by the articles) several proxies); s. 372(5)
(lodgment of proxies may not be more than 48 hours in advance of the meeting in question
or its adjournment); s. 372(6) ( proxy solicitations must be sent to all or none of the members,
not just some of them).
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immediately visible from the articles of any company,38 particularly
those of a large and sophisticated company,39 there is still a large
amount for the articles to do, in relation to proxies,
notwithstanding section 372: for example, rules about the validation
of proxies, as noted above;40 rules about the termination and
revocation of proxies,41 and rules governing the rights of proxies—
in particular, the right (if any) to speak at a general meeting.42
Another simple example of this basic freedom for shareholders to
organise their own aﬀairs, later limited by statute, but not entirely
abrogated, is the means by which a company may properly give
notice of a general meeting. The Act of 1862 had nothing to say about
notice of meetings. At common law, if an organization’s constitution
does not provide how notice shall be given, it is one of the functions
of the organization’s governing body to prescribe how such notice
shall be given on any particular occasion.43 The general eﬀect of
section 16 of the 1862 Act on shareholders’ voluntary arrangements,
embodied in a company’s articles of association, meant that those
articles could prescribe how notice would be given to its members,44
and Table A (1862) made appropriate provision in regulations 35 and
95–97. The 1862 Act, however, saw ﬁt to make some default
provision for general meetings of companies. These default rules were
set out in section 52 of the Act, the distant precursor to section 370 of
the Companies Act 1985. Still, even today, a company’s articles, given
eﬀect by section 14 of the 1985 Act, deal with many aspects of calling
a general meeting, though mandatory statute law has now become
important, as will be seen.45
Of course, notwithstanding this great legal freedom to organise the
internal governance structures of a company, the means of
communication available in the nineteenth century signiﬁcantly
constrained how the members of a company could interact with each
other and take decisions. Face-to-face meetings were the most
practical way for members of a company to participate its aﬀairs,
38 See, e.g., Table A (1985), regs. 59–62.
39 See, e.g., BP plc, arts. 81, 86.
40 See, above n. 35 and also examples such as BP plc, arts. 83–84.
41 See, e.g., Table A (1985), reg. 63; BP plc, art. 85.
42 See, e.g., Table A (1985), reg. 46; BP plc, arts. 81, 85.
43 Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliﬀe (1879) 13 Ch.D. 346, 352.
44 The corresponding Australian provisions, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.), s. 140 and its various
precursors, have the same eﬀect. So, in Australia, notice of a general meeting given to a
company’s members by fax was assumed to be good, so long as the company’s articles
allowed for such notice, even before the addition to the 2001 Act of section 243J(3), which
explicitly provides for such notice: Jenashare Pty. Ltd. v. Lemrib Pty. Ltd. (1993) 11 A.C.S.R.
345 (Supreme Court of New South Wales).
45 See, for example, Table A (1985), regs. 37–39 (convening of meetings; form of notice; saving
of meetings where the company accidentally fails to give notice to a person entitled to receive
it). See also ‘‘Growing Statutory Regulation: 1900–1985,’’ below. As might be imagined, much
more sophisticated provision is often made by larger companies: see below, ‘‘The Modern
Evolution of Shareholder Governance’’.
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given the technologies available at the time. There was the possibility
of voting by post,46 and later through a proxy deposited by
telegraph,47 but these never displaced the signiﬁcance of meetings.
This meant, of course, that questions about the constitution and
proceedings of company meetings came to be litigated, and such
litigation was often resolved by application of principles established
in cases which concerned meetings in other contexts, such as public
meetings or the meetings of chartered corporations.48 Some of those
principles were default rules, which could be ousted or modiﬁed by
a company’s articles: for example, the principle that failure to give
due notice of a meeting to all those entitled to such notice vitiates
the meeting,49 a principle which is now generally modiﬁed by a
company’s articles,50 as well as rules governing the adjournment of
meetings.51 Others of those principles might well be mandatory,
drawing their force from considerations of public policy, such as
the rule that requires notices of meetings to be fair, accurate and
comprehensible, particularly as regards decisions which concern
directors’ own interests relating to the company.52 Cases also
elucidated terms used in the statute, or in a company’s articles,
such as the question of what actually amounted to a ‘‘meeting’’.53
Still, none of this law demanded any particular form of
corporate decision-making by shareholders: it regulated general
meetings which originally were only required by section 49 of the
Companies Act 1862 and by any relevant provisions of a
company’s own articles. The key to shareholders’ rights within a
company, and the key to the exercise of those rights, were the
governance structures adopted by the shareholders themselves,
embodied in the company’s articles of association and given eﬀect
by section 16 of the 1862 Act, the precursor to section 14 of the
Companies Act 1985.
The matter did not rest there, of course. Over time, mandatory
statute law came increasingly to regulate how shareholders in a
46 McMillan v. Le Roi Mining Company Ltd. [1906] 1 Ch. 331 adverts to this possibility, though
the High Court in fact struck down a postal ballot held by the company, because it could not
hold postal ballots consistently with its articles. However, the implication is that had the
articles been diﬀerent, so too might have been the result.
47 Re English, Scottish & Australian Bank [1893] 3 Ch. 385 illustrates this possibility, though the
case itself concerned a statutory meeting to approve a scheme of arrangement.
48 See the treatment of ‘‘general principles’’ of meetings by the works cited in note 2 above.
49 Smyth v. Darley (1849) 2 H.L. Cas. 789, 9 E.R. 1293; Musselwhite v. C.H. Musselwhite & Son
Ltd. [1962] Ch. 964; Royal Mutual Beneﬁt B.S. v. Sharman [1963] 1 W.L.R. 581.
50 See, e.g., Table A (1985), reg. 39. Such an article is vitally important in practice, because
English statute law contains no provision mitigating the common law consequences of failure
to give due notice. Contrast, e.g., Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.), s. 1322, and Companies Act
(Singapore), s. 392.
51 See, e.g., Byng v. London Life [1990] Ch. 170.
52 Kaye v. Croydon Tramways [1898] 1 Ch. 358.
53 See again Byng v. London Life [1990] Ch. 170.
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company were to participate in its aﬀairs. This regulation assumed
that shareholders would make decisions at face-to-face meetings.
These assumptions were reﬂected in the statutory drafting; and
statute, drawing on those assumptions, all too often entrenched
them.
B. Growing Statutory Regulation: 1900–1985
The Companies Act 1900 began to increase the statutory regulation
of general meetings. Section 12 of the Act introduced the
requirement that a company should hold a ‘‘statutory meeting’’ in
the period between one month and three months after its
registration. The main purpose of the meeting was to review the
basic aﬀairs of the company—its capital and its management. Since
the statutory meeting was abolished by section 82 of the Companies
Act 1980, there is no need to dwell on it further. Section 13 of the
1900 Act introduced the statutory right of members holding 10% of
the issued capital of a company to requisition a general meeting of
the company.54 This right meant that the shareholders could require
a meeting whether or not they had power to do so under the
company’s articles, and whether or not the company’s directors
were willing to use their powers to call a meeting.55
After that, the Companies Act 1907 introduced further
amendments to the law of company general meetings. Section 24(1)
and (2) of the 1907 Act tightened up the requirement for an annual
general meeting. These provisions replaced section 49 of the 1862
Act, and they also empowered the court to call an annual general
meeting when the company failed to do so.56 Section 24(3)
introduced the right of a corporation to appoint a representative
who could act for it as its alter ego at any meeting of a company
in which the corporation held shares.57 These changes were then
consolidated with the 1900 reforms, and the remaining relevant
portions of the 1862 Act, to form sections 64–71 of the Companies
(Consolidation) Act 1908.
Then came sections 21–27 of the Companies Act 1928. Some of
these changes were enacted to give eﬀect to recommendations of
54 This provision, in an amended form, survives as Companies Act 1985, s. 368.
55 Art. 30 of Table A (1862) allowed the company’s members to set the timetable for ‘‘Ordinary
Meetings’’ (today known as annual general meetings). Art. 32 gave the company’s directors a
power to call extraordinary general meetings. Art. 32, together with Art. 33, also allowed one
ﬁfth (or more) of the company’s members to require that the directors call an extraordinary
general meeting. Art. 34 allowed the same number of members to convene the meeting
themselves if the directors failed to do so within the requisite time. In the light of Companies
Act 1900, s. 13, it is safe to infer that a signiﬁcant number of companies did not adopt Arts.
32–34 of Table A (1862) or equivalent provisions.
56 See, presently, Companies Act 1985, s. 367, vesting the power in the Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry, rather than the court.
57 This provision, somewhat amended, survives as Companies Act 1985, s. 375.
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the Greene Committee.58 Section 21 of the 1928 Act made some
amendments to the now defunct ‘‘statutory meeting’’. Section 22
revised the requirements for a company’s members to call a general
meeting, bringing them towards their modern form.59 Section 23
reformed the default rules for general meetings, such as minimum
notice, votes per share, quorum and so on.60 It also introduced the
power of the court to order a general meeting.61 Section 24 of the
1928 Act reformed the right of a corporation to appoint someone
to represent it at meetings.62 The remaining changes were directed
towards reforming special and extraordinary resolutions,63 and
administrative matters such as the keeping and inspection of
records. Importantly, section 27 gave members of a company the
right to inspect minutes of its general meetings.64 Finally, section 30
of the 1928 Act enacted the rule that resolutions of adjourned
meetings are treated as passed at the adjourned meeting, and not at
the original meeting.65 All these changes were consolidated with the
remaining parts of the 1908 Act into sections 112–121 of the
Companies Act 1929.
The next set of developments was enacted as sections 1–8 of the
Companies Act 1947, in preparation for consolidation into the
Companies Act 1948. Again, the report of a review committee lay
behind may of the developments, this time the Cohen Committee.66
Section 1 of the 1947 Act introduced some amendments to the
regulation of annual general meetings. In particular, the court’s
power to order an annual general meeting was transferred to the
Board of Trade, nowadays the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry. Section 2 amended the provisions as to notice of the
‘‘statutory meeting’’, general meetings, special resolutions and
resolutions on special notice. (The latter was itself a concept
introduced by the 1947 Act.) It also dealt with the laying of
accounts and the appointment of auditors. Importantly, section 2
turned the rules about the length of notice for general meetings
from pure default rules into mandatory minima which could only
be increased by a company’s articles. Section 3 introduced the right
58 W.A. Greene et al., The Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee (London 1926),
xx34–37, and Part II, pp. 54–55.
59 See note 54 above and its accompanying text.
60 See Companies Act 1985, sections 369, 370, though the rules in section 369 now form a
mandatory minimum, subject to disapplication in accordance with the section.
61 See, presently, Companies Act 1985, s. 371.
62 See, presently, Companies Act 1985, s. 375.
63 See, presently, Companies Act 1985, s. 378.
64 This right is now found in Companies Act 1985, s. 383.
65 The position at common law was that a resolution passed at an adjourned meeting was
treated in law as passed at the original meeting: see, e.g., Neuschild v. British Equatorial Oil
Co. [1925] Ch. 346. See now Companies Act 1985, s. 381.
66 Sir Lionel Cohen et al., The Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmd.
6659 (1945)), xx124–129, 132–136.
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of members to have a company circulate notice of resolutions to be
proposed by those members at the company’s general meeting, as
well as their statements about business to be transacted at the
meeting.67 Section 4 of the 1947 Act introduced the mandatory
right of members to demand a poll.68 Section 5 of the 1947 Act
introduced the last of the main changes. First, it laid down the
mandatory right of a member to appoint a proxy.69 Second, it
made clear that a member who has more than one vote need not
cast them all the same way on a poll.70 This clariﬁcation was very
important for nominees who held parcels of shares to the order of
diﬀerent beneﬁciaries, and it had been made necessary by the
unfortunate deﬁnition of special resolutions and extraordinary
resolutions in section 117 of the 1929 Act.71 In conclusion, sections
6–8 of the 1947 Act made other minor amendments to the
provisions concerning the court’s (and, then, the Board of Trade’s)
power to order meetings, as well as to the provisions on record-
keeping. These changes, together with the unamended portions of
the 1929 Act, were consolidated into sections 130–146 of the
Companies Act 1948. In due course, and after very slight
modiﬁcation in the intervening years,72 these sections were re-
enacted as sections 366–383 of the Companies Act 1985.
There has been no change, however, to the basic legal
mechanisms through which shareholders in a company establish
and regulate their rights in the company. These mechanisms still
consist in the arrangements adopted by the shareholders themselves,
embodied in the company’s articles of association, and given eﬀect
by section 14 of the Companies Act 1985. What changed over time
was the extent and impact mandatory statute law which sought to
regulate the shareholders’ freedom to organise their own aﬀairs
within the company.
67 See, presently, Companies Act 1985, ss. 376 and 377.
68 See, presently, Companies Act 1985, s. 373. According to the common law of public meetings,
any qualiﬁed person may demand a poll, but this right was commonly regulated, before the
commencement of the Companies Act 1948, by companies’ own articles of association. See,
generally, Buckley on the Companies Acts (note 16 above), at [373.4].
69 See, presently, Companies Act 1985, s. 372.
70 See, presently, Companies Act 1985, s. 374.
71 Section 117(5) of the 1929 Act required the calculation of votes according to the number of
votes to which each member was entitled, which implied that his vote could not be split. This
wording ultimately reﬂected Companies Act 1862, s. 51. Similarly, Joint Stock Companies Act
1856, s. 34 required a three quarters majority in number and value of shareholders in order to
pass a special resolution, which also implied that a single shareholder’s votes could not be
split.
72 See Buckley on the Companies Acts (note 16 above), Derivation Table at [0.33], concerning
what are now Companies Act 1985, sections 370, 380 and 382.
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C. Some Relaxation: 1985—Present
The period since the last consolidation of the companies legislation
has seen relaxation of the regulation aﬀecting private companies,
albeit through the enactment of lengthy new exceptions to
regulatory rules, rather than by repeal or comprehensive
restatement of the rules themselves. Other reforms have aﬀected all
companies, both public and private. In total, there have been four
sets of relevant amendments since 1985.
The ﬁrst set was in 1989. Sections 113–114 of the Companies
Act 1989 introduced what are now sections 381A–381C and 382A,
and Schedule 15A, of the Companies Act 1985. These provisions
dealt with written resolutions. They were designed to ensure that
private companies could pass resolutions by unanimous written
assent, whether or not the company’s articles permitted this.73
Section 116 of the 1989 Act also introduced section 379A of the
1985 Act, containing the concept of the ‘‘elective resolution’’, by
which private companies could dispense with certain regulatory
requirements. Two of those requirements in fact concerned general
meetings of companies. So, section 366A of the Companies Act
1985 was introduced to allow a private company to dispense with
holding an annual general meeting; and amendments to section 369
of the 1985 Act made it easier for private companies to hold
meetings and pass resolutions on short notice. Finally, section
143(9) of the 1989 Act made minor changes to section 383 of the
1985 Act (record-keeping).
The second set of amendments comprised consequential changes
made necessary by the introduction of single member private
companies in 1992. Thus, section 370A (quorum at meetings of the
sole member) and section 382B (recording of decisions of the sole
member) were inserted into the Companies Act 1985.74
The advent of electronic communications resulted in a third,
much more substantial set of changes to the legislation dealing with
shareholders’ governance rights within a company. The same
reforms also amended Table A (1985), but that is irrelevant for the
present purpose of describing how regulation developed.
73 It was in fact so common for a company’s articles to make provision to this eﬀect that it even
appears in Table A (1985) as reg. 53. Such a provision, like reg. 53 itself, is usually much
simpler than Companies Act 1985, sections 381A–381C. Companies with older, less
comprehensive articles might ﬁnd they had to rely on the statutory powers, though a speciﬁc
power could always be inserted into a company’s articles pursuant to Companies Act 1985, s.
9. See generally C. Mercer, ‘‘Sections 113–114–Written Resolutions: What about Table A?’’
(1991) 12 Company Lawyer 220, but compare H.W. Higginson, ‘‘Written Resolutions of
Private Companies’’ (1993) 109 L.Q.R. 16.
74 Companies (Single Member Private Limited Companies) Regulations 1992 (S.I. 1992/1699), r. 2
and Schedule paras. 5 and 6.
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By the late 1990’s, statutory regulation of decision-making by
shareholders eﬀectively prevented companies from using new
technology—electronic communications—to organise general
meetings. Vitally important non-statutory regulation, in the form of
the Listing Rules, also stood in the way. Two particular problems
stood out: the regulation of how a company might give notice of
its general meetings, and the regulation of how a member of the
company might appoint a proxy to act for him at such meetings.
Before the advent of Companies Act 1985 (Electronic
Communications) Order 2000,75 section 369 of the Companies Act
1985 did not explicitly require notice of a company’s general
meetings to be in tangible form, but it may well have done so by
implication.76 The contrary was arguable, however,77 principally
on the grounds that the statutory requirement of notice ‘‘in
writing’’ included notice given by non-tangible text, applying the
extended statutory deﬁnition of ‘‘writing’’.78 Even if that were
true, however, it was not the end to the problems of listed
companies in this connection. The Listing Rules, as they then
stood,79 also assumed tangible notices of meetings,80 and a
tangible accompanying circular.81 Furthermore, the requirement in
the Rules, that shareholders in a similar position be treated
equally,82 cast doubt on the propriety of sending written notices
to some shareholders and electronic notices to others. In the
result, regulation cast suﬃcient doubt on the validity of using
electronic communications to give notice of general meetings that
companies generally stuck to tangible notices. The 2000 Order
intervened to alter this situation, but the form of this legislation,
and its underlying assumptions, are not necessarily ideal, as will
be seen.83
There were very similar problems in relation to the appointment
of proxies. It was suggested that section 372(5) of the Companies
Act 1985, before the amendments introduced in 2000, required that
proxies must be appointed by an ‘‘instrument’’, in other words, by
tangible writing.84 Again, there were counter-arguments, that
75 S.I. 2000/3373.
76 See Department of Trade and Industry, Electronic Communication: Change to the Companies
Act 1985 (London 1999).
77 See V. Edgtton, ‘‘Appointment of Proxies by Electronic Communication: Do Companies Have
to Wait for Enabling Legislation?’’ (2000) 21 Company Lawyer 294.
78 Schedule to the Interpretation Act 1979, given force by section 5 of that Act.
79 Listing Rules as at 31st December 1999.
80 Ibid., rr. 14.17–14.19, though compare ibid., Appendix 1 to Chapter 13, para. 18, which
envisaged notices by advertisement.
81 Ibid., rr. 14.3–14.6; 14.14; 14.16.
82 Ibid., r. 9.16, implementing Council Directive 79/279/EEC, Schedule C, para. 2(a).
83 See note 169 below and its accompanying text.
84 Department of Trade and Industry, note 76 above.
C.L.J. The Continuing Evolution of Shareholder Governance 107
section 372(5) (as it then stood) merely limited the conditions which
might be attached to the use of an ‘‘instrument’’ in connection with
the appointment of a proxy.85 Still, fears that section 372 did
invalidate the use of electronic communications to appoint proxies
were suﬃcient that companies would not take the risk of allowing
proxies to be appointed other than by tangible writing. Similarly,
the Listing Rules at the time seemed to indicate that a form of
proxy to be sent with a notice of meeting should be a tangible
document.86 This constituted another reason for listed companies to
stick to established practice for appointing proxies.
The problem was that regulation, both in statute and in the
Listing Rules, assumed (rather than clearly mandated) that the way
to give clear notice of a meeting in permanent form, and the way
to appoint a proxy with less risk of confusion or fraud, was to use
a tangible document. That may have been true in 1947,87 but it was
certainly no longer true by 1999. Old fashioned regulation of the
means to achieve an end started to look highly inappropriate with
the development of new means to the same ends, means that were
unanticipated when the regulation was ﬁrst introduced.
In response to these problems, various provisions of the
Companies Act 1985 were amended by the Companies Act 1985
(Electronic Communications) Order 2000.88 Section 366A of the
1985 Act was amended so that a member of a private company
could use electronic communications to demand an annual general
meeting and terminate the company’s election to dispense with an
AGM.89 Section 369 of the 1985 Act was amended so that
companies could use electronic communications to call general
meetings.90 Sections 372 and 373 of the 1985 Act were amended to
make it clear that members of a company could appoint proxies
using electronic communications.91 Finally, section 379A of the
1985 Act was amended so that a private company could use
electronic communications to give notice of a meeting to pass an
elective resolution.92
The last set of relevant amendments were consequential changes
to the law made necessary by the introduction of ‘‘treasury shares’’
in 2003.93 These amendments were designed to ensure that any
85 Edgtton, note 77 above.
86 Listing Rules (as at 31st December 1999), rr. 9.26; 13.1(f ); 13.2; 13.28; 13.29; Appendix to
Chapter 13, paragraph 12.
87 See the text following note 68 above.
88 S.I. 2000/3373.
89 Ibid., r. 17.
90 Ibid., r. 18.
91 Ibid., rr. 19, 20.
92 Ibid., r. 21.
93 Companies (Acquisition of Own Shares) (Treasury Shares) Regulations 2003 (S.I. 2003/1116).
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shares held in treasury (i.e., issued and owned by the same
company) were eﬀectively disenfranchised, and that valid decisions
could be taken without regard to treasury shares.94
Yet these developments since the commencement of the
Companies Act 1985 have not changed the basic legal principles
which establish shareholders’ governance rights within a company
and underpin the expression of those rights: that is, the company’s
articles of association as adopted by the shareholders and given
eﬀect by section 14 of the 1985 Act. Some of the regulation to
which these principles were subject has been relaxed or altered, for
a variety of reasons. Nevertheless, the principles endure to this day,
notwithstanding the growth of the simple, basic rules of the
Companies Act 1862 into the much more complex provisions of
Part IX, Chapter IV of the Companies Act 1985.
D. The Business to be Done
As well as the growth of regulation outlined above, the very
business to be done by members of a company may dictate its form
and so limit the extent to which those members can, through the
company’s articles of association, determine how they order their
aﬀairs within the company. Statutory deﬁnitions are the key issue
here.
Very often, a decision must be taken by special resolution,95 and
occasionally by extraordinary resolution.96 The deﬁnitions of
‘‘special resolution’’ and ‘‘extraordinary resolution’’ are both
currently found in section 378 of the Companies Act 1985. Both
deﬁnitions require that votes be cast ‘‘at a general meeting’’ in
order for the resolution in question to be carried. (This surely
includes votes on a poll called at the general meeting.)97 Both
deﬁnitions also require a 75% majority of those voting in person or
by proxy (not, for example, by post),98 and it is unlikely that this
94 Ibid., Schedule paras. 19–25, amending Companies Act 1985, sections 368 (meetings on
members’ requisition), 369 (length of notice for meetings), 370 (general default rules as to
meetings), 373 (rights to a poll), 376 (resolutions proposed by members), 378 (deﬁnitions of
extraordinary and special resolutions) and 380 (registration of certain resolutions).
95 Business requiring a special resolution, which might commonly be encountered at a company’s
general meeting, includes various alterations to the company’s memorandum (Companies Act
1985, sections 4–6, 17, 28, 43, 53), alterations to its articles (ibid., s. 9), disapplication of pre-
emption rights over unissued capital (ibid., sections 89, 95), reduction of capital (ibid., s. 135)
and authorisation to buy-back shares oﬀ-market, or under a contingent purchase contract
(ibid., sections 164, 165).
96 For example, the alteration of class rights under Companies Act 1985, s. 125, or voluntary
winding up under Insolvency Act 1986, s. 84(1)(c).
97 See Shaw v. Tati Concessions Ltd. [1913] 1 Ch. 292; Spiller v. Mayo (Rhodesia) Development
Co. (1908) Ltd. [1926] W.N. 78 and Holmes v. Keyes [1959] Ch. 199.
98 The High Court has held that the concept of voting ‘‘personally or by proxy’’, used in a
particular company’s articles, necessitated physical presence by either the shareholder in
question or his valid proxy: McMillan v. LeRoi Mining Co. Ltd. [1906] 1 Ch. 331. It is
diﬃcult to see why the same words in section 378 would be construed any diﬀerently. The
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mandatory requirement of statute could be ‘‘deemed away’’ by a
company’s memorandum or articles. Consequently, if a company
wishes to pass a special resolution or an extraordinary resolution, it
will have to hold a meeting, unless valid unanimous consent
(whether written or informal) can be obtained from all those
entitled to vote.99 So for practical purposes, the deﬁnitions of a
‘‘special resolution’’ and an ‘‘extraordinary resolution’’ also set
limits on how members can organise the means through which they
take decisions.
Over time, the constraints which ﬂow from these deﬁnitions, as
to how shareholders in a company participate in its aﬀairs, have
grown in their importance: the regulatory impact of the deﬁnitions
has increased through the years. This is so even though special
resolutions have formed a part of United Kingdom companies
legislation since 1856, and extraordinary resolutions since 1862.100
Under the Companies Act 1862, special resolutions were used only
to change a company’s articles,101 and extraordinary resolutions
were only used to begin the voluntary winding up of a company.102
(The Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 had used special resolutions
for both purposes.)103 Consequently, a company rarely needed to
convene a meeting in order to pass a special or an extraordinary
resolution. Correspondingly, the deﬁnitions of such resolutions
rarely constrained the form of a decision by the members of a
company. Nowadays, special resolutions are needed for many more
purposes.104 The deﬁnitions of special and extraordinary resolutions
therefore constitute a much greater practical limitation on how
shareholders may eﬀectively take decisions.
The deﬁnition of an elective resolution likewise anticipates a
meeting of the (private) company in question,105 unless there is
unanimous consent of the company’s members in lieu of a
requirement of voting ‘‘personally or by proxy’’ goes right back to the deﬁnition of a special
resolution in Companies Act 1862, s. 51 (following Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, s. 34),
and to the deﬁnition of an extraordinary resolution in section 129 of the 1862 Act.
99 Such consent might be (i) pursuant to the company’s articles, such as Table A (1985), reg.
53; (ii) in the case of a private company, pursuant to Companies Act 1985, sections 381A-
381C and Schedule 15A, or (iii) pursuant to the common law principle of informal
unanimous consent (see, e.g., Re Express Engineering Works Ltd. [1920] 1 Ch. 466; Re
Duomatic Ltd. [1969] 2 Ch. 365; Cane v. Jones [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1451; Wright v. Atlas Wright
(Europe) Ltd. [1999] 2 B.C.L.C. 301; Re Torvale Group Ltd. [1999] 2 B.C.L.C. 605; Euro
Brokers Holdings Ltd. v. Monecor (London) Ltd. [2003] EWCA Civ 105, [2003] 1 B.C.L.C.
506, at [61]–[63], per Leslie Kosmin Q.C., [2003] EWCA Civ 105, [2003] 1 B.C.L.C. 506, at
[57]–[63], per Mummery L.J., and EIC Services Ltd. v. Phipps [2003] EWHC 1507 (Ch),
[2003] B.C.C. 931, at [121]–[122], per Neuberger J.). See notes 107–110 below, and their
accompanying text, as regards limitations on the principle of unanimous informal consent.
100 See note 98 above.
101 Companies Act 1862, s. 50.
102 ibid., s. 129. See MacConnell v. E. Prill & Co. Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch. 57, 62, per Sargant J..
103 Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, sections 33 (alteration of articles) and 102 (winding up).
104 See note 95 above.
105 Companies Act 1985, s. 379A.
110 The Cambridge Law Journal [2006]
meeting.106 However, such resolutions are quite explicitly designed
to simplify the administration of closely held private companies,
and allow such companies to be run with less need for meetings so
long as the resolutions remain in force. The form of elective
resolutions does not, therefore, constitute an enduring restraint on
the mechanisms of shareholder governance.
As well as the means of taking a decision, the subject matter of
the decision can limit how the decision is made. For example, a
resolution to dismiss a director under section 303 of the Companies
Act 1985 will involve a formal meeting, because of the director’s
right under section 304 to make a statement about his proposed
removal to the general meeting which may remove him from
oﬃce.107 Similarly, removal of auditors under section 391 of the
1985 Act will be impossible without a meeting, because of the
auditors’ rights under sections 391(4) and 390 of the Act to address
the meeting which may sack them.108 In all these cases, the
requirement for a meeting arises from a statutory determination
that the meeting is to constitute a forum for more than just the
members of the company concerned, with the consequence that the
non-members cannot be deprived of their voice by the members’
arrangements between themselves.
Other statutory provisions may necessitate that members of a
company make a decision at a physical general meeting, or else by
means of some other device approved by statute, such as a
statutory written resolution, even though the relevant provisions do
not give rights to anyone who is not a member of the company.
For example, statute may require that members of a company
‘‘pass a resolution’’ if they wish to achieve a certain result; and
such language may then implicitly forbid other forms of decision-
making by the members, unless other provisions of statute explicitly
authorise such conduct.109 Again, a formal meeting may be
necessary to persuade a court to exercise some discretion,110 though
perhaps a valid statutory written resolution would now suﬃce.
Interestingly, all the provisions of this nature which have come to
court concern decisions by members of a company which can
directly prejudice the interests of those who are not members of a
company, such as the company’s creditors. In such cases, the courts
are, perhaps, particularly concerned to see strict adherence
106 Companies Act 1985, s. 381A(6).
107 In this regard, note Companies Act 1985, Schedule 15A, para. 1.
108 ibid., para. 2.
109 See Re R.W. Peak (Kings Lynn) Ltd. [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 193. Note also the various statutory
provisions which require a decision of ‘‘the general meeting’’ or ‘‘the company in general
meeting’’.
110 See the possibility raised, though not the result reached, in Re Barry Artist Ltd. [1985] 1
W.L.R. 1305.
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procedure as a safeguard for those who are directly aﬀected by the
decision but cannot formally participate in it.
In short, when ‘‘outsiders’’ to a decision by members of a
company have rights to participate in the process which leads to
decision, or when the courts consider that statute has prescribed
particular forms of decision-making at least in part for the beneﬁt
of such ‘‘outsiders’’, then the members must adhere to the relevant
form of decision-making prescribed by statute. That will either
make a meeting strictly necessary, or else make it practically
unavoidable unless another form of decision-making, such as a
written resolution, is both authorised by statute and practically
feasible. Nevertheless, where statute merely requires a decision by
the members ‘‘in general meeting’’, that has generally been
construed as a procedural requirement capable of waiver by the
members so long as the interests of non-members are not thereby
prejudiced.111
A further example of business which must be done at a general
meeting, and not otherwise, is the laying of the company’s annual
report and accounts before the meeting,112 unless the company is
private and has taken advantage of the ability to dispense with this
requirement.113 A listed company must also lay its directors’
remuneration report and its operating and ﬁnancial review before a
general meeting, and seek approval of the directors’ remuneration
report.114 Such requirements are relatively uncommon, however.
E. Listed Companies and Listing Requirements
The Listing Rules have also aﬀected the freedom of a listed
company to establish structures for participation by its shareholders
in the company’s aﬀairs. Some tangential eﬀects of the listing rules,
such as the eﬀect of rules regarding proxies, have already been
addressed.115 However, the Listing Rules, until recently, had a much
more direct eﬀect on the terms of a listed company’s articles of
association. For a long time, the Listing Rules required the articles
to contain certain terms, some of which were relevant to
participation by shareholders in the company,116 though the Stock
Exchange (then the listing authority) could always, in its discretion,
111 See the cases cited in note 99, part (iii), above.
112 Companies Act 1985, s. 241.
113 Companies Act 1985, sections 252 and 379A (elective resolution procedure).
114 Companies Act 1985, sections 241, 241A.
115 See the text to note 79 above, and following.
116 Listing Rules (1966 ed.) r. 1 and Appendix, Section A; r. II(a)(iv) and Schedule VII, Part A,
paras. F, H and L; (1973 ed.) r. 159 and Appendix 34, Schedule VII, Part A, paras. F, H, L;
(1979 ed.) rr. 1, 6 and Schedule VII, Part A, paras. F, H, L; (1984 ed.) Section 2, Chapter 1,
r. 2.5 and Section 9, Chapter 1, paras. 6, 8, 12, 14; (1993 ed.) rr. 13.8, 13.28, 13. 29 and
Appendix 1 to Chapter 13, paras. 12, 13, 18, 19, 22; (2000 ed.) rr. 9.26, 9.43, 13.28, 13.29;
(2005 ed.) rr. 9.3.6, 9.3.7, 9.3.9.
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waive compliance, either fully or in part.117 Later editions of the
Listing Rules removed nearly all the requirements for articles to
contain such terms, though the Stock Exchange, and then the
United Kingdom Listing Authority, still required a listed company
to submit its articles to scrutiny and control if they contained
unusual provisions.118 More recently still, however, the United
Kingdom Listing Authority has removed even this requirement of
submission and control.119 As a result, the current edition of the
Listing Rules only controls the provisions (if any) of a listed
company’s articles which govern the form in which a member of
the company may appoint a proxy, or which impose sanctions on a
member of the company for failure to comply with section 212 of
the Companies Act 1985 (disclosure to a company of interests in its
shares).120
So the Listing Rules have, in their time, formed a constraint on
the freedom of a listed company to establish the terms on which its
shareholders will participate in the company’s aﬀairs. They have
never been a major constraint on that freedom, however, as they
never concerned more than a few aspects of these structures. Still,
the Listing Rules have driven the creation of those terms of
engagement between a listed company and its shareholders, and
inertia—perhaps more accurately, path dependence—may mean that
such terms still are common today, even though the Listing Rules
are much less relevant for present purposes than was once the case.
F. Summary
A survey of history demonstrates some fundamental points. Most
importantly, it establishes that the foundations of shareholder
decision-making and shareholder governance in a company are the
arrangements between those shareholders (and the company) given
eﬀect by section 14 of the Companies Act 1985. The legal core of
shareholder governance is the existence and use of a statutory
freedom. This basic structure was established by the Companies Act
1862, drawing on the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, and none
of the subsequent changes to the law have altered it. It may have
become obscured by subsequent statutory regulation; but it still
exists, and it is still important, as will shortly be made clearer.
Consequently, there is no need, when designing innovate decision-
117 Listing Rules (1966 ed.) Appendix, para. 1; (1973 ed.) Appendix 34, para. 2; (1979 ed.)
Appendix, para. 1; (1984 ed.) Section 1, Chapter 1, para. 2; (1993 ed.) r. 13.3; (2000 ed.) rr.
1.11–1.14; (2005 ed.) r. 1.2.1.
118 Listing Rules (1993 ed.) rr. 13.1 and 13.3; (2000 ed.) r. 13.3 (which followed the language of
Amendment 14 of January 2000 to the 1993 ed.).
119 See the Listing Rules (2005 ed.).
120 Listing Rules (2005 ed.) rr. 9.3.6, 9.3.7, 9.3.9.
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making structures for shareholders, to require the speciﬁc
authorisation of statute to ensure their eﬃcacy: there already is a
basis for giving eﬀect to shareholders’ arrangements inter se,
namely the general eﬀect of section 14 on a company’s articles of
association.121
Nevertheless, regulation has had a large impact on the basic
freedom of shareholders in a company to arrange their rights of
governance within the company. Statute sometimes explicitly
requires that a company should hold a meeting—for example, an
annual general meeting, or a meeting on the requisition of
shareholders. More often, however, statutory rules (and, where
applicable, non-statutory regulation, such as the Listing Rules) have
assumed that general meetings are the means through which
shareholders take decisions. Statute has therefore sought to regulate
shareholder decision-making by reference to the holding of
meetings. Good examples of this tacit assumption are to be found
in the deﬁnitions of special and extraordinary resolutions: those
deﬁnitions assume that shareholders will use general meetings to
take corporate decisions. Unfortunately, an assumption that was
broadly valid when it was ﬁrst made has limited shareholders’
ability to order their aﬀairs in deﬁance of that assumption now it
no longer holds good. Also, Parliament has very occasionally
enacted speciﬁc requirements that business be done at a meeting.
The overall consequence of increased regulation has been to
make it very diﬃcult for shareholders to use any means other than
general meetings to take corporate decisions, unless the company
concerned has suﬃciently few members that they can realistically
avoid the need for general meetings by using either written
resolutions (whether under the company’s articles or pursuant to
statute) or the principle of unanimous informal consent.
Admittedly, one old English case,122 and some Australian cases on
companies limited by guarantee,123 all assume that shareholders in a
company could take a decision by postal ballot—that is, otherwise
than at a meeting—if the company’s articles so provided. The cases
correctly reﬂect the underlying ability of the members in a company
to order their own decision-making processes. However, none of
those cases addresses regulatory limitations on the members’
freedom—for example, the limitations on the decision-making
process inherent in seeking to pass a special or an extraordinary
121 Indirect investors’ participation in the aﬀairs of a company is another matter: see note 19
above.
122 McMillan v. LeRoi Mining Co. Ltd. [1906] 1 Ch. 331. See note 46 above.
123 Scullion v. Family Planning Association of Queensland (1985) 10 A.C.L.R. 249, Rivers v. Bondi
Junction-Waverley RSL Sub-Branch Ltd. (1986) 5 N.S.W.L.R. 362, NRMA v. Parker (1986) 6
N.S.W.L.R. 517.
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resolution. Given that the members of a company may often need
to pass a special resolution, and will then need to hold a general
meeting (rather than using a postal ballot, for example), the
freedom recognised in the cases is rather more limited in practice
than their language might suggest. So regulation has greatly
circumscribed shareholders’ freedom to organise their own aﬀairs.
However, as the next section will show, that freedom is very far
from irrelevant.
III. THE MODERN EVOLUTION OF SHAREHOLDER GOVERNANCE
The freedom of shareholders in a company to organise how they
exercise their rights in the company can be seen even in standard
form, unsophisticated articles of association, such as Table A
(1985). However, it is even more evident, and practically more
important, in the articles of large, listed companies. The articles of
Amersham plc, Astrazeneca plc, BHP Billiton plc, BP plc and
Carnival plc all contain prominent examples of the use, and
consequent importance, of this freedom.124 They are far from the
only examples. They do, however, give a ﬂavour of relevant current
practice: they demonstrate qualitatively what can and has been
done. This is all that need be done to show the continuing
importance of arrangements ordained by shareholders themselves,
rather than by legislation: an exhaustive quantitative report on such
practice is a project for another time.
Articles often set out in much greater detail than Table A
(1985)125 the information which is to be given to shareholders by
way of notice for a general meeting.126 Advance warning can be
given of multi-site meetings,127 and so ensure that such meetings are
not held invalid for want of notice. Particular items of business, or
particular procedures attaching to particular items of business, can
be highlighted, so that particularly important decisions—or the
manner in which they are taken—are emphasised. All these things
go to the good governance of a company. Articles also generally
provide that accidental failures in the provision of notices for a
meeting will not invalidate that meeting or the business done at
it.128 They can also make provision for unanticipated changes to
the time or location of meetings, while preserving the validity of the
meeting.129
124 See note 18 above.
125 Table A (1985), reg. 38.
126 Amersham plc, art. 50; Astrazeneca plc, art. 33; BP plc, arts. 59,60; Carnival plc, arts. 100–
102. Contrast BHP Billiton plc, art. 47, giving huge discretion to the company’s board.
127 See the text to note 151 below.
128 See note 50 above.
129 Amersham plc, art. 51.5; Astrazeneca plc, art. 34.5; Carnival plc, art. 107.
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Articles can control where meetings are to be held.130 This might
seem a minor matter, but it is rather less so in companies which
are the result of cross-border mergers, where the company has to
accommodate shareholder bases in more than one country, as well
as the sensitivities of those shareholders.
Articles facilitate the administration of general meetings. They
may provide that the entitlement to vote is established at a
particular record time before the meeting.131 This facilitates
veriﬁcation of votes tendered at the meeting, by allowing the
company to use records for that purpose which it will actually have
in its possession at the meeting. (Precisely up-to-date records will
not be available to a company whose shares are traded
continuously.) Articles can provide protection from errors in the
voting process, which (in small measure, at least) are almost
inevitable when casting and counting the many millions of votes
held by the various shareholders of a large, listed company.132
Articles also commonly give many powers given to the chairman of
a company’s general meeting, most of them administrative (such as
powers of adjournment, powers to call a poll, and powers to
maintain good order), some of them substantive (such as a casting
vote).133
Articles can categorise items of business or resolutions to be
addressed at general meetings. Commonly, business is categorised as
‘‘special business’’ or other (‘‘ordinary’’) business for the purposes
of giving notice of that business:134 often, only general notice is
required of ‘‘ordinary’’ business, rather than the much more
detailed notice required for ‘‘special’’ business. In addition, the
Listing Rules require a listed company to provide its members with
a full explanation of ‘‘special business’’.135 However, in recent
times, companies have drawn and used distinctions between
‘‘substantive’’ and ‘‘procedural’’ resolutions, in order to control
how business is done at a general meeting.136 Articles provide that
a ‘‘substantive resolution’’ (as deﬁned) can only validly be
considered or passed at a meeting if the text of the resolution was
130 BP plc, art. 55.
131 BP plc, art. 60(D).
132 See the diﬀerent techniques adopted by Amersham plc, art. 74; Astrazeneca, arts. 43, 55;
BHP Billiton plc, arts. 55(4), 55(1); BP plc, arts. 71, 80; Carnival plc, arts. 135, 144, 153.
133 See, e.g., Table A (1985), regs. 45, 46(a), 47–51, 58; Amersham plc, arts. 55, 57–58, 59(a), 60–
64; Astrazeneca plc, arts. 38, 40–41, 42(a), 43–47; BHP Billiton plc, arts. 48, 50–56; BP plc,
arts. 64, 66–67, 70(i), 71–74, 80; Carnival plc, arts. 110, 114–115, 117–119, 133(a), 135, 137–
139, 141, 144.
134 Amersham plc, art. 50; Astrazeneca plc, art. 33; BP plc, arts. 60–61.
135 Listing Rules (2005 ed.) rr. 13.3.1 and 13.8.9.
136 BHP Billiton plc, arts. 2, 54; BP plc, arts. 2, 69. To similar eﬀect are Amersham plc, art. 58
and Astrazeneca plc, art. 41. Carnival plc, art. 117 envisages amendments to substantive
resolutions, but enables the chairman to adjourn consideration of an amended substantive
resolution.
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set out exactly in the notice by which the meeting was convened.
Thus, no amendment to a substantive resolution can be taken at
the meeting without thereby making it impossible to pass the
resolution.137 This control over amendments might seem to advance
the interests of directors over shareholders, enabling the directors to
exert a tighter grip on the agenda of a meeting. In fact, the
opposite is true. It enables shareholders who do not attend a
meeting to know exactly what business will be done at the meeting,
so they can appoint and instruct proxies accordingly.
Categorisation of business within a company’s articles of
association is sometimes used in very subtle ways to facilitate the
creation of parallel corporate structures, where two entities
incorporated in diﬀerent jurisdictions are established to own
common operating subsidiaries.138 So, a company incorporated in
England can, through its articles, ensure that a shareholder
representing the interests of a foreign company has an inﬂuence
over the English company on certain items of business
proportionate to the foreign company’s share of the combined
capital of the two companies.139
Another issue which companies’ articles of association nowadays
address in growing detail is security at general meetings. Articles
therefore often contain explicit provision for directors (and
management generally) to put in place security arrangements at
general meetings; and shareholders’ rights are subjected to those
arrangements.140 While a company most likely has an implied
default power at common law, exercisable through its board, to
institute security arrangements at its general meetings,141 speciﬁc
articles are much clearer and often more wide-ranging. The exercise
of these powers can be a very sensitive indeed, particularly where
protesters against the company’s business or activities are
shareholders, and make a scene at the company’s general meeting
in a manner which may be threatening to others present.
Articles can also place restrictions or limitations on
shareholders’ voting rights. Such restrictions are very commonly
137 Amendments to correct clerical or manifest error are commonly permitted: ibid.. See also Re
Moorgate Mercantile Holdings Ltd. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 227 as regards the amendment of a
resolution requiring exact notice (in that case, a special resolution).
138 These structures are sometimes created on mergers so that there can be two parent
companies, incorporated and listed in two jurisdictions. Examples (inter alia) are BHP
Billiton plc / BHP Billiton Ltd. (a UK/Australian structure) and Carnival plc / Carnival
Corporation (a UK/Panamanian structure).
139 See, e.g., BHP Billiton plc, arts. 59–62; Carnival plc, arts. 124–160.
140 Amersham plc, art. 52.2; Astrazeneca plc, art. 35.2; BHP Billiton plc, art. 53(2); BP plc, arts.
63, 74–75; Carnival plc, art. 110.
141 Hamer and Robertson, Running Company Meetings, (note 2 above), p. 86, paras. 10.2, 10.4.
Note also John v. Rees [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1294 and Barton v. Taylor (1886) 11 App. Cas. 197,
204, per Lord Selborne, which concern meetings, but not company general meetings, and also
Byng v. London Life [1990] Ch. 170, 187, per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C.
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used as a means of putting practical pressure on shareholders to
comply with other obligations. So, for example, shares are
commonly disenfranchised while calls made on their holder remain
unpaid.142 Again, shares are very often disenfranchised where a
public company serves a notice pursuant to section 212 of the
Companies Act 1985 to discover who is beneﬁcially interested in its
shares, and there is a failure to comply with the notice.143 Indeed,
articles often impose even more onerous restrictions on shares
which are the subject of an unanswered Section 212 Notice: the
company may refuse to pay dividends otherwise payable on the
shares, and it may in certain circumstances refuse to register
transfers of the shares.144
There are many other examples of the various ways in which a
company’s articles of association can determine how shareholders
will exercise their rights within a company. (Indeed, it should not
be forgotten that a company’s articles primarily establish what
rights attach to particular shares in any event, even in the case of a
listed company.)145 For the present, it is worth mentioning the
extent to which articles deal govern the appointment of proxies;146
the way in which articles can be used eﬀectively to enfranchise
those with interests in shares who are not, however, the legal owner
of the shares;147 the provision which can be made for purely
consultative meetings,148 or for interested non-shareholders to view
meetings without participating in them,149 and the additional
provision which can be made for a single corporate shareholder to
appoint several representatives at a company’s general meeting.150
142 Amersham plc, art. 70; BP plc, art. 79; Carnival plc, art. 151. Forfeiture for non-payment of
calls does not amount to an unlawful reduction of capital (Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) 12
App. Cas. 409, 417, per Lord Herschell, 429, per Lord Watson and 438, per Lord
Macnaughten), and so it can be authorised by a company’s articles irrespective of the
statutory procedures for the reduction of capital or the redemption or repurchase of shares.
143 Amersham plc, arts. 71–72; Astrazeneca plc, arts. 53–54; BHP Billiton plc, art. 64; BP plc,
art. 87; Carnival plc, arts. 155–156. See also note 120 above and its accompanying text.
144 Ibid.
145 See, e.g., Table A (1985), reg. 54; Amersham plc, art. 67; Astrazeneca plc, art. 50; BHP
Billiton plc, arts. 61–62; BP plc, art. 76; Carnival plc, arts. 147–148. Companies Act 1985, s.
370 provides default rules for voting if the company’s articles make no relevant provision: see
the text to note 45 above.
146 See, e.g., Table A (1985), regs. 60–63; Amersham plc, arts. 76–79, 81; Astrazeneca plc, arts.
58–61, 63; BHP Billiton plc, arts. 68–71; BP plc, arts. 81–86; Carnival plc, arts. 161–167, 169.
See also the text following note 30 above.
147 See, e.g., Amersham plc, art. 80; Astrazeneca plc, arts. 135–142; BP plc, arts. 157–170. See
also Nolan, above note 8.
148 BAE plc, art. 105(B).
149 See, e.g., BP plc, art. 62(C).
150 See, e.g., Amersham plc, art. 80. It is at least arguable that, on its true construction,
Companies Act 1985, s. 375 only allows a corporate shareholder to appoint one
representative: see Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares: Report by Paul
Myners to the Shareholder Voting Working Group (note 6 above), p. 27. The ability to for a
single corporate shareholder to appoint more than one representative is vitally important
where the shareholder is a nominee for many diﬀerent beneﬁciaries: ibid..
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Finally, the expansion of what is meant by a ‘‘meeting’’ has
itself allowed innovative, constructive provisions in a company’s
articles to harness modern communications technology and so
increase shareholders’ opportunities to participate in the company.
For reasons explained in the previous section, it is necessary for
public companies, at least, to hold meetings within the meaning of
the Companies Act 1985. Whether or not a gathering or other
interaction constitutes a ‘‘meeting’’ for the purposes of the Act, or
for the purposes of any other applicable regulation, is determined
by the relevant deﬁnition of what amounts to a ‘‘meeting’’.
However, the Act itself does not deﬁne a ‘‘meeting’’: the Act leaves
the deﬁnition to the common law. (A company’s articles can deﬁne
what amounts to a ‘‘meeting’’ for their own purposes; but the
articles obviously cannot deﬁne what constitutes a ‘‘meeting’’ for
other purposes.) In Byng v. London Life,151 the Court of Appeal
gave a wide meaning to the word ‘‘meeting’’ so that it would
encompass people, or groups, who were not in the same place but
who could communicate as if they were, using modern technology.
Companies have since then, through their articles, taken advantage
of this broad deﬁnition, and provided not only for the use of multi-
site ‘‘meetings’’ in this modern sense, but also for many of the
problems which might result, such as what would happen if the
technology were to fail at an inopportune moment.152
This recent development of ‘‘multi-site meetings’’ is an example
of companies working constructively within the constraints of
regulation, by acknowledging the necessity for general meetings but
exploiting an expansive deﬁnition of ‘‘meetings’’. It is not an
example of companies determining the mechanisms for shareholder
participation wholly unconstrained by regulation. Nevertheless, it
still shows the vitality and innovation of private solutions—
solutions adopted by the members of companies themselves—to the
diﬃculties of involving shareholders in the governance of their
company. Such innovation, and the many other examples of
innovative practice described above, form a vital, if often neglected,
part of the context for any law reform.
IV. THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF SHAREHOLDER GOVERNANCE
The foregoing survey of history and current practice shows that the
rules which govern shareholders’ exercise of their rights in a
company—and, indeed, those rights themselves—have evolved,
151 [1990] Ch. 170.
152 Amersham plc, art. 51; Astrazeneca plc, art. 34; BHP Billiton plc, art. 53(5); BP plc, art. 62;
Carnival plc, arts. 103–105.
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through the repeated, iterative interaction of various parties.
Shareholders and companies—or, more accurately, the legal
practitioners who draft the internal corporate arrangements that the
shareholders ultimately adopt—have devised various structures
through which shareholders—and others—can participate in the
governance of a company. They have done so to the extent
admitted by changing companies legislation, though regulation,
both statutory and non-statutory, may sometimes limit what they
can do. They have learnt from each others’ work, and they have in
turn adapted their practice accordingly. They have also interacted
with, and reacted in response to, the courts when the structures
they devised came to be challenged. Much less frequently, they have
lobbied for changes in the law and so brought the process of legal
evolution back to focus on legislation.
In these interactions, this area of company law resembles many
other areas of commercial law, such as the law relating to the sale
of goods, bills of exchange and ﬂoating charges.153 Unlike those
branches of the law, however, modern company law is
fundamentally a creation of statute, and it was Parliament that ﬁrst
established the freedom for those who form a company to order its
aﬀairs through its articles of association, though Parliament drew
on the prior experience of unincorporated joint stock companies.154
Since then, however, lawyers acting for companies or their
shareholders have generally been much more innovative than the
state, as witness the foregoing survey of both history and current
practice. But what of the future?
A. The Principles of Policy
The ﬁrst and most general question of policy for present purposes
is whether Parliament should continue the present approach to
decision-making by shareholders, establishing broad, general,
facultative principles, such as section 14 of the Companies Act
1985, moderated by speciﬁc regulation, within which the
participants in companies can order their own aﬀairs. The
alternative is for Parliament to provide a speciﬁc number of speciﬁc
mechanisms through which shareholders could express themselves.
There are two main grounds for continuing to prefer the present
approach: liberalism and eﬃciency.
Why liberalism? The fact is, British company law manifests
deliberate choices in favor of allowing shareholders to exercise
residual and ultimate control in companies, and these choices have
153 See R.M. Goode, Commercial Law (London 2004) and R.C. Nolan, ‘‘Property in a Fund’’
(2004) 120 L.Q.R. 108.
154 Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (note 16 above), p. 58.
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been conﬁrmed for the foreseeable future at least.155 This choice has
very substantial support, at least outside the academy.156 So long as
Parliament continues to accept that companies are, so far as their
shareholders are concerned, voluntary associations in which the
shareholders exercise residual and ultimate control, then it should
continue to legislate from a presumptive premise that those
shareholders should be allowed to order their own aﬀairs. (Of
course, very diﬀerent considerations come into play when
considering the ‘‘proprietary’’ aspects of company law, such as rules
on capital and limited liability, where the interests of non-
consenting parties are aﬀected by the rules chosen).157 None of this,
however, denies the possibility of regulating even the internal
structures of companies. It simply establishes a presumption in
favor of free association, and demands reasons to depart from that
presumption.
Why eﬃciency? In order to answer the question, it is necessary
to recall that eﬃciency is a instrumental good: it assumes a desired
goal. In the present case, that goal is, for reasons just noted, to
facilitate the creation of voluntary associations, companies, in
which the members of those companies can, at least presumptively,
order their own aﬀairs. So what is eﬃcient in that context? Law
which allows companies and their lawyers to devise the internal
structures of companies is much more likely to evolve into useful,
eﬃcient forms, with variations that reﬂect diﬀerent circumstances,
than rules made by Parliament, which often form a single set of
rules, or at most one set of rules for private companies and another
for public companies.158 The approach of the Company Law
Review to reform appears, however, to focus on legislation, rather
than innovation by companies, shareholders and their advisers.159
Now, legislation could very helpfully provide default rules for
companies, so that small companies are not necessarily put to the
expense of changing their articles in order to take advantage of new
developments. Nevertheless, legislation should not set a certain
practice in stone and thereby freeze innovation, as has happened in
155 See note 13 above and its accompanying text.
156 Ferran, note 12 above, p. 132.
157 As to the ‘‘proprietary’’ aspects of corporate law, see J. Armour and M.J. Whincop, ‘‘The
Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law’’, University of Cambridge CBR Working Paper
299, available at hhttp://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/cgi-bin/cbr_wpfull3.pl?series=cbrwps&ﬁlename
=cbr2005&paperid=WP299i.
158 Note the distinctions between private and public companies in Companies Act 1985, Part IX,
Chapter IV.
159 Company Law Review, Final Report, (note 5 above), xx 7.7 (statutory provision for multi-site
meetings), 7.11 (statutory authority for electronic voting, though this paragraph is ambiguous
as to whether the legislation should be mandatory or permissive), 7.13 (statutory rights for
proxies), 7.20 (statutory codiﬁcation of the unanimous informal consent rule).
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the past.160 Again, however, none of this involves rejecting any
thought of regulating a company’s internal structure: it too raises a
presumption in favor of free association, and demands reasons to
depart from that presumption.
The reasons for advocating these views have nothing whatsoever
to do with the inherent capabilities of those who work in the
private or public sectors—far from it. There are, however, other
good reasons. The United Kingdom has a large number of highly
sophisticated commercial and corporate lawyers. The transactional
lawyers amongst them (and that is the very substantial majority of
them) deal with vastly more relevant cases through which corporate
structures are created or reﬁned than lawyers and policy-makers in
the public sector. Transactional lawyers also deal with each case in
much greater detail, and with far greater intensity, than
Parliament—or any regulator—possibly could. There are far more
transactional lawyers, who collectively (and sometimes individually)
possess far greater resources (in terms of time, ﬁnance and
information) than those dealing with internal corporate structures
in the public sector. Transactional lawyers also disseminate their
expertise swiftly when designing new structures through which
shareholders participate in companies, so that evolution of new
forms is fast and vigorous. This is partly because the relevant
specialist lawyers operate mostly within an interconnected
community, the City of London, where new developments spread
quickly;161 but partly also because the results of their work, articles
of association, are publicly available from Companies House (and
now via the internet), so that anyone interested has immediate
access to an exact record of new developments for the nominal sum
of £1 per downloaded copy.162
All this adds up to the very vigorous evolution of internal
corporate structures through the frequent interaction of private
parties, and the rather less frequent interactions of those parties
with the state, manifested in the courts and Parliament. This system
for creating and developing the internal structures of companies
acknowledges that law, and the arrangements made pursuant to
law, are necessarily provisional, and will need to evolve, because
law, and the arrangements made pursuant to it, are founded on
bounded information and rationality deployed in an ever changing
context. In other words, the system rests on pragmatic, rather than
160 See ‘‘The Historical Evolution of Shareholder Governance’’, above.
161 A good example of this is the spread of the techniques for enfranchising the holders of
depositary receipts backed by shares of companies incorporated in England. From BP plc
adopting this technique in December 1998, it spread rapidly to other companies. See Nolan,
note 8 above.
162 See hhttp://www.companieshouse.gov.uki and hhttp://direct.companieshouse.gov.uki.
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idealistic, assumptions about the process of forming legal
structures.163 (The question of how the goals of the law are, and
should be, set is another matter, but settled for the moment as
regards company law in the United Kingdom.)164 Consequently, the
system allows for trial—and error. It demands a minimum
acceptance of risk—there may be undesirable results. That is,
however, what exposes it to its critics.
It is always easy to highlight the risk of harm, and to use such
risk as an argument against any particular course of action. It is
much more diﬃcult to acknowledge such risk and yet still advocate
the action, even following an honest, careful attempt at a risk/
beneﬁt calculation (or, more accurately, a risk/beneﬁt estimation)
which gives reasonable grounds for predicting that any harm will
be outweighed by good. The problem is the fear of risk itself.
Correspondingly, when something undesirable has happened, it is
seductively easy to blame those who took the risk of that unwanted
consequence. In turn, fear of blame becomes another reason not to
take a risk in the ﬁrst place. Furthermore, it is much harder to
show that the risk-averse course of action could well have produced
worse results. Conversely, if risk is allowed, with desirable
consequences, those who take the risks, rather than those who
allowed them, are likely to get the credit. In short, advocating any
system which allows risk has asymmetrical advantages and
disadvantages to those who would allow risk: it is hard to argue in
favor of risk-taking. Yet would modern corporate law (let alone
contract law) exist if such an aversion to risk had always governed
the law? It is highly unlikely. Risk is the inescapable cost of
innovation.
B. The Regulatory Approach
What, then, of regulation? The arguments just put forward have
not sought to deny any role for regulation of a company’s internal
aﬀairs. Yet those arguments do have implications which concern
the incidence, extent and form of any such regulation.
The history of English commercial law, in its broadest sense,
provides some useful guidance for the future development of
company law: how to accept risk as the price of innovation, but
nevertheless manage and mitigate it. Much of modern commercial
law, for example, developed as the courts accepted commercial
practice. Speciﬁc problems were addressed individually and were
resolved through litigation, and, much more rarely, through speciﬁc
163 Note D. Goddard, ‘‘Company Law Reform—Lessons from the New Zealand Experience’’
(1998) 16 Company and Securities Law Journal 236 at footnote 42.
164 See note 13 above.
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legislative intervention. Only later did Parliament attempt to codify,
restate or signiﬁcantly amend these bodies of law.165 To put the
point in more general terms, there was ﬁrst an acceptance of
innovation, and an acceptance of trial and error. Only later, once a
signiﬁcant corpus of law, practice and experience had built up, did
Parliament intervene in any systematic fashion.
More generally still, the point is that inductive, minimally
categorising, ‘‘bottom up’’ methods of rule-making were used in the
earlier stages of developing a system, when understanding of the
system was sketchy; and deductive, generally categorising, ‘‘top
down’’ methods were used once a signiﬁcant body of knowledge
had accumulated to form the premises in this process of
reasoning.166 There is much to commend such an approach: it takes
account of the varying—let it be hoped expanding—boundaries of
knowledge; it accepts that hasty intervention, in ignorance, can
stiﬂe innovation and even be counterproductive; but it accepts also
that there is a very useful role for legislation and regulation—in
clarifying the law and dealing in a principled fashion with the
problems revealed by experience, rather than by conjecture
(however well informed).
Now these general lessons of history can inform the
development of the law and regulation of companies’ internal
structures. Companies are regularly amending their articles in
response to new technological developments, and in response to
new developments of legal practice observed in other companies.167
General experience suggests that the pace of change is unlikely to
slacken. The nature of any relevant change is also very hard to
foresee. Twenty years ago, who would have imagined the internet
or its present importance? In other words, corporate practice is in
the early stages of evolution in response to a continuing series of
new stimuli, and is likely to remain so for some time.
The appropriate legislative and regulatory response should
therefore accommodate the ongoing evolution of corporate practice,
in order to promote the acknowledged goal of corporate law
reform in the UK—the facilitation of modern, responsible,
competitive business.168 It should do this ﬁrst by retaining the basic
facultative principles of UK corporate law, derived from our
Victorian forebears, who themselves lived in equally fast changing
165 See generally Goode (note 153 above).
166 As regards the diﬀerent types of rule, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford 1994),
pp. 124–136.
167 This was immediately apparent from the author’s survey of articles of association (see notes
15 and 18 above): 89% of the articles surveyed had been adopted or amended in the 4 years
before the sample date for the survey (16th January, 2004).
168 See note 4 above.
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times. These principles allow participants in a company, and their
advisors, to adapt the arrangements they make for their governance
of the company to meet new and often unforeseen developments.
Unfortunately, legislators have in the past often proceeded by
enacting speciﬁc solutions, which are often cumbersome, or at least
limiting, and can only be adapted by further legislation.169 That, in
a country like the United Kingdom, is not often forthcoming.170
Equally, regulation should not consist of any general codiﬁcation of
how shareholders in a company, and any indirect investors in the
company, should engage with each other and with managers of the
company. As has been noted already, the structures through which
shareholders (and indirect investors) participate in companies are
developing rapidly in response to many new stimuli, and that looks
set to continue indeﬁnitely. Consequently, any such project of
codiﬁcation is entirely inappropriate at present and likely to remain
so for the foreseeable future.
The response of regulation should also involve speciﬁc
legislation or regulation where necessary to address problems
revealed by experience. In order to avoid creating implicit and
often unintended barriers to innovation, it should also be careful
that legislation and regulation—and the deﬁnitions used in them—
do not rest on assumptions that are outmoded, or may quickly
become so. In particular, it should be very cautious of regulating
the means by which shareholders participate in companies, because
those means are now in a such a state of ﬂux.
These, then, are the principles that should guide the formation
of policy. The application of that policy to any proposals for
reform of the law is, however, another matter for another time.
169 Consider Companies Act 1985, sections 381A-381C and Schedule 15A (unanimous written
resolutions). The amendments to the law governing the use of electronic communications in
relation to general meetings (see note 88 above and its accompanying text) also form a
speciﬁc solution to a problem and may well in time become restrictive, as anticipated by the
Company Law Review: see The Strategic Framework (note 4 above), x5.7.19; Completing the
Structure (note 13 above), x5.39; Final Report (note 5 above) x7.11. See also note 159 above.
The temptation to enact speciﬁc legislation is not unique to the United Kingdom: in
Australia, see The Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Shareholder Participation
in the Modern Listed Company: Final Report (Sydney 2000), pp. 63–74, and, in Delaware, see
General Corporations Law, x211.
170 See ‘‘The Historical Evolution of Shareholder Governance’’, above, showing two facultative
reforms in the past 59 years. The problem of legislative inertia might well be eased by the
creation of a ‘‘Companies Commission’’, empowered to update corporate law through
secondary legislation. The Company Law Review recommended this (Final Report (note 5
above), chapter 5, esp. at xx5.49–5.58, 5.69), but the Government did not accept the
recommendation (Modernising Company Law (note 1 above), at xx5.25–5.27). Use of the
reform powers proposed in Company Law: Flexibility and Accessibility (London 2004) and
clauses 774–788 of the Company Law Reform Bill might also alleviate the problem.
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V. CONCLUSION
Sometimes, regulation of an activity can become so prominent that
it is easy to forget the mechanisms through which the activity is
given legal eﬀect in the ﬁrst place. So long as the activity proceeds
in its accustomed fashion, there are often few practical
consequences of such forgetfulness. Those involved simply do what
they have always done, adapting occasionally and unreﬂectively to
new regulation. They achieve their ends without any great need to
consider how they did so. Such has been the fate of the law which
concerns the governance of a company by its shareholders.
Nevertheless, a clear understanding of such law matters a great
deal, and for a variety of reasons. First, any informed discussion of
shareholder engagement in a company—whether such engagement
is called corporate democracy, shareholder activism or anything
else—requires a clear understanding of the legal underpinnings for
shareholders’ participation in the company. Second, such an
understanding is the indispensable foundation on which legal
practitioners have created—and still do create—innovative
structures through which shareholders can participate in companies.
Third, a clear understanding of the present law, and, equally
importantly, the practice which builds on that law, is vital to any
fair evaluation of proposed reforms to that law. Such an
understanding also forms the necessary basis for further study of
how and why participants in companies, and their advisers, reacted
as they did to the freedoms and constraints established by this
body of law, as well as the foundation for any comparative study
of participation by shareholders in companies from diﬀerent
jurisdictions.
This article has sought to show the existing legal principles
which underpin decision-making by shareholders in companies
incorporated in Britain. It has also sought to show how regulation
has come to restrict those principles, to an undesirable extent. Even
so, those involved with companies—directors, shareholders and
their advisers, particularly their lawyers—have used these basic
principles with great innovative ﬂair, and without the need for
frequent legislative intervention. There are good reasons to continue
to prefer such an approach, and to modify accordingly the
regulatory accretions of the years.
Clearly, however, further work is needed to address other issues.
These include an evaluation of speciﬁc UK and EU proposals to
reform this area of law; a broadly based, quantitative analysis and
evaluation of legal practice which builds on the relevant law, and a
comparison with the position in various other jurisdictions. Such
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work will have to address many interesting theoretical, historical
and practical questions which, for reasons of space alone (if
nothing else) cannot be answered here. After all, this article itself
indicates how long it takes to explore deeply how just one legal
system provides for shareholders to participate in companies—and
what corresponding indulgence is required of those who read such
an article.
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